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It’s a tricky paradox that, as the mind becomes more advanced, its concomitant increases in complexity limit its capacity for 
self-comprehension. To make matters worse, it’s precisely these 
more advanced minds that are most susceptible to the delusion 
of omniscience. This state of affairs culminates in a mind that is 
intelligent enough to approach self-knowledge, but not intelligent 
enough to realize where it falls short. Luckily, some minds have been 
able to surmount this particular hurdle and have reached a humbler 
conception of consciousness. One example of this feat can be seen in 
Patricia Churchland’s Consciousness: the Transmutation of a Concept, 
in which the neuroscientist-cum-philosopher argues that the mind 
is far too intricate for all of its contents to be available to its owner. 
The transparency thesis—the belief that every idea, every thought, 
and every desire is available for conscious analysis through the lens of 
introspection—may be comforting. The problem, Churchland makes 
clear, is that such a perspective is far too arrogant and simplistic to be 
true. 
 In her attack on the transparency thesis, Churchland doesn’t 
belabor any definition of the term, calling it “the venerable dogma 
that one’s mental life is self-intimating and introspectively available” 
(Churchland 80). In many ways, her brevity in defining the concept 
is appropriate: the transparency thesis is so ingrained into popular 
notions of consciousness that an explicit delineation of its tenets is 
superfluous. The popularity of the transparency thesis is largely the 
result of our natural intuitions regarding our mental life. The bulk of 
our phenomenal consciousness consists of us thinking about the things 
we want to think about. Even when we think about things we don’t 
want to think about—when our thoughts seemingly drift of their own 







sense that, with sufficient introspection, all of our mental processes 
can be rendered visible. 
 The issue, though, is that if anything in our mind were opaque—
that is to say, invisible—we would by definition be unaware of it. 
Without any awareness of these underlying processes, we’d have no 
reason to think that mental life wasn’t transparent. Perhaps, one might 
argue, we’d have the feeling that we weren’t perceiving something—
that there was something there, lurking below the surface. While this 
is possible, it’s made unlikely by another feature of our consciousness: 
a fundamental egotism. This is arguably an inevitable corollary of 
consciousness, and it results in a philosophy that’s self-centered and 
self-aggrandizing. The sort of solipsism we’re biased towards makes 
the transparency thesis appealing: if we’re all-knowing, all-powerful 
creatures, of course we should be able to know our own thoughts! 
However, as Patricia Churchland goes on to show, what’s appealing 
isn’t always what’s right. 
 In attacking the transparency thesis, Churchland’s central 
strength—which relates to her background as a hard scientist—is her 
ability to marshal empirical evidence. This is a refreshing departure in a 
field that can often seem mired in thought experiments and theoretical 
postulates. Churchland refers to several studies that suggest we’re not 
conscious of everything that goes on in our minds. For example, our 
brains produce responses to stimuli of which we’re not consciously 
aware. More sensationally, these unnoticed phenomena are capable of 
altering our subsequent behavior. One example of this is that people 
will claim they prefer things to which they’ve been exposed, even when 
that exposure is so rapid—on the order of milliseconds—that conscious 
awareness of it is impossible (Churchland 81). This is important for 
a couple of reasons. For one, it shows how stimuli can exist and be 
processed without our conscious awareness. But it also shows that our 
brain can respond to these stimuli, altering the body’s course of action, 
without us noticing a thing. It’s not that there are simply subliminal 
phenomena in the environment—it’s that these phenomena can impact 
our behavior without us having any idea that we are being affected.
 Churchland also shows how stimuli of which we’re entirely aware 
have ramifications we can’t appreciate. One example of this is priming, 
where behavior is subconsciously influenced by environmental stimuli. 
For example, one study found that giving people hot coffee led them to 
categorize a person as kinder (i.e., warmer, though that particular word 
was never given to the subjects in the study) than did a group given iced 
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coffee (Williams & Bargh, 2008). In this case, both groups of people 
were aware of the temperature of the beverage they were given, but 
not of the impact that this seemingly arbitrary variable had on their 
subsequent behavior. Churchland presents another example with 
similar significance: without knowing it, humans judge the friendliness 
of their peers based on the size of their pupils. Again, Churchland 
illustrates that we can be aware of stimuli without being aware of 
their effects on us. This is mutually exclusive with the transparency 
thesis, which argues that the reasons behind our actions are always and 
entirely accessible. 
 It’s only when we interrupt the processes we’re subconsciously 
dependent on that their importance becomes evident. To show this, 
Churchland presents the example of blind people who subconsciously 
rely upon echolocation in order to navigate. These people aren’t 
aware of their dependence on environmental sound, let alone capable 
of explaining how they use it to navigate. And yet they clearly do: 
when their ears are plugged to prevent echolocation, they perform 
measurably worse at navigating. While the introspective accounts of 
these blind subjects neglected to account for the role of audition in 
navigation, their minds relied on that very modality. If the mental were 
fully transparent, such a disparity would never occur: every factor 
influencing us would be available for conscious consideration.
 Another example concerning vision offers additional evidence 
of the shrouded nature of the mental. Blindsight is the phenomenon 
wherein people who are self-professedly blind are capable of visual 
feats—distinguishing a vertical from a horizontal line, for example—
that surprise even themselves. The precise mechanism of this ability is 
less important than what it says about the mind, which is that we have 
entire abilities of which we’re unaware. This strikes yet another blow 
against the transparency thesis: what could testify more to the fact that 
the mental is mysterious than the fact that it harbors capabilities of 
which we’re ignorant? 
 Churchland’s reference to blindsight is convincing in the 
immediate, but upon scrutiny reveals several cracks that offer toeholds 
for critics. For one thing, Churchland is referencing a disorder—
something that is by its nature deviant from the norm. When she 
talks about blindsight, what she’s saying is that a diseased brain has 
the capability to fool itself. To conclude that this says anything about 
a healthy brain is quite the jump. This is especially striking because 
Churchland opens her paper by arguing that non-transparency “is the 
nature of the case” (Churchland 81). If this were true, it seems odd that 
she would have to refer to pathologies to prove her point.
 Even when Churchland is making points about healthy brains, 
her conclusions often seem extreme. For example, she claims that the 
existence of subliminal stimuli that influence behavior is proof that 
the transparency thesis is false. But perhaps it’s disingenuous to call 
these influences anything more than reflexes. If that’s the case, then 
it isn’t surprising that we’d be unaware of these influences: they are 
simply environmental conditions causing bodily changes. This process 
is more analogous to something like glycogen breakdown in response 
to low blood sugar than it is to the mind’s production of thoughts. 
What this suggests is that Churchland is intentionally inflating the 
claims of transparency theorists in order to make it easier to dismiss 
their arguments. A more realistic transparency theorist would argue 
that only higher-level thoughts, and not basic mental processes, are 
available through introspection.
 Whether or not Churchland’s characterization of the transparency 
theory is absolutely balanced, the issues she raises with respect to its 
central tenets are insurmountably problematic. It doesn’t particularly 
matter whether Churchland relies on examples from pathologies in 
some of her examples of non-transparent minds, because the rest of 
her evidence concerns phenomena that affect every human, sick and 
healthy alike, and indicate that the mind has much more going on than 
we realize. Further, Churchland might argue that even if we’re aware 
of all higher-level thoughts, the fact that we’re oblivious to the factors 
that influence their origin and manifestation indicates that the mental 
isn’t transparent. In other words, we see the cake but none of the 
ingredients, so it makes little sense to call ourselves bakers.
 Churchland herself acknowledges the surprise involved in 
countenancing a mind that isn’t fully one’s own. It seems like a paradox: 
the entity we take to be ‘I’ is our mind, and yet that mind—our entire 
being—can never fully know itself. But there’s a physical analogue to 
this problem: David Foster Wallace’s meditative short story Backbone 
describes a boy who attempts to touch every part of his body, only to 
discover that much of it is inaccessible. Even though that body is his—
even though that body is him—absolute self-knowledge will always 
elude him.
 The more one looks at the intricacies of the mind, the more 
this sort of inaccessibility seems inevitable. If only as a matter of 
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pragmatism, it’s not feasible to be consciously aware of every cog in the 
organ that controls the whole machine. One growing body of research 
in psychology and neuroscience is that investigating multitasking, and 
the fact that we only have so many cognitive resources to spread among 
various tasks. If this is the case—and it certainly appears to be—then it’s 
no surprise that we’d take mental shortcuts, even in our analysis of our 
own minds. 
  The transparency thesis is seductive—instinctual, even—but this 
doesn’t mean it’s right. If anything, this intrinsic appeal discredits the 
transparency thesis, as it suggests we’d accept the thesis without much 
in the way of reason: we don’t have to prove it, because we already 
believe it. Our innate beliefs often merit the most scrutiny, as it’s 
easiest for them to elude skeptical eyes. 
 It’s likely that people will resist Churchland’s reasoning and cling 
to the transparency thesis because the alternative strikes them as 
disheartening. We think of ourselves as being in charge, as dictating 
what our brain does. But if much of what it does is hidden, we lose power 
and agency over the one thing we expect to rule. But Churchland’s 
attitude is a healthier alternative to this view: she doesn’t grieve over 
her loss of control, but instead marvels at a mind that is powerful 
enough to function in that control’s absence. The mind may have 
aspects that are intractably invisible, but that only makes for a richer, 
more wonderful picture. 
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